Abstract. The Exponential Challenge Response (XRC) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol. We propose a complementary analysis of these schemes; on the basis of this analysis we show how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be mounted against the HMQV protocol when some session specific information leakages happen. We define the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes; using these schemes we propose the Fully Hashed MQV protocol (with security arguments), which preserves the remarkable performance of the (H)MQV protocols and resists the attacks we present.
Introduction
Implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols have gained wide acceptance; in addition to providing implicit authentication, these protocols are usually more efficient than the explicitly authenticated ones. The HMQV protocol [11] , inspired by the famous MQV protocol [14, 1, 2, 9, 10, 20, 8] , was proposed with security arguments in the Canetti-Krawczyk model [5] . HMQV was designed in accord with the principle that "a good security system is not one that denies the possibility of failures but rather one designed to confine the adverse effects of such failures to the possible minimum" [11] . Session secret leakages may happen; in that case the exposed session may be compromised, but this should have no effect on the security of any other unexposed session.
In this paper, we propose a complementary analysis of the Exponential Challenge Response (XCR) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes. On the basis of this analysis we show how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be performed against HMQV when some session specific information leakages happen. We propose the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes. With these schemes we define the Fully Hashed MQV protocol (with security arguments), which resists the attacks we present and preserves the remarkable performance of the (H)MQV protocol. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze some aspects of the XCR and DCR signatures schemes; we show how session specific information leakages can be used for impersonation and man in the middle attacks against (H)MQV. In section 3 we define a CanettiKrawczyk type security model [5, 13] for the (H)MQV type protocols. In section 4, we propose the FXCR and FDCR signature schemes; and using these schemes we propose the FHMQV protocol. Section 5 deals with the FHMQV security arguments; in section 6 we present the FHMQV-C protocol (the 'C' stands for key confirmation) , which provides additional security attributes, namely key confirmation and perfect forward secrecy. We conclude in section 7.
The following notations are used in this paper: G is a multiplicatively written cyclic group of prime order q generated by G, |q| is the bit length of q. The identity element in G is denoted1, Shank's method is deterministic, but requires a large storage; using the Pollard's Kangaroo method [24, 25] 
Exploiting Session Secret Leakages in the HMQV Protocol
A HMQV key exchange between two partiesÂ andB is as in Protocol 1; if any verification fails, the execution aborts.
Protocol 1 HMQV key exchange
I) The initiatorÂ does the following: Roughly speaking, the secret shared betweenÂ andB is a DCR signature with messages fixed toÂ andB. In [11] , Krawczyk There is however a subtlety: in Schnorr's scheme the random element e, used byB when computing s, is always provided by the verifierÂ; while in the XCR and DCR schemes, when A's message m 1 is fixed (toB as in all the sessions betweenÂ andB) the value of e, used when computing s B , depends only on the ephemeral key Y provided by (the signer)B. This is what makes the replay attacks possible against the XCR and DCR schemes, and the (C, H)MQV(-C) protocols, when ephemeral secret exponent leakage happens.
Impersonation Attack using Session Secret Leakage
We show in this section how ephemeral secret exponent (s A or s B ) leakage can be used for impersonation attack 2 . The following definition gives a broader view of the points needed for impersonation attack; these points are recalled to make the analysis reading easier.
Definition 3 (Point for impersonation attack, i-point).
LetÂ andB be two entities with respective keys A, B ∈ G * . A group element R ∈ G * is said to be a HMQV i-point forÂ toB if there exists some k ∈ [1, q − 1] such that R = G k A −H(R,B) ; k is said to be the decomposition.
Proposition 2.
Let G = G be a group with prime order q,Â andB two entities with respective keys A, B ∈ G * . There is at least q − (2 l + 1) HMQV i-points forÂ toB.
Proof. Let G be the image of G through (RH −→R =H(R,B)). SinceH is a l-bit hash function, the cardinal of G is 2 l . For everyȲ ∈ G there is at most one element R 0 ∈ G such that R 0 =Ȳ and R 0 AR 0 =1; since the existence of another element R ′ 0 ∈ G, which satisfiesR ′ 0 =Ȳ and
be the set of such R 0 points. The cardinal of R 0 is at most 2 l . Every element R ∈ G * \ R 0 is a HMQV i-point forÂ toB. Indeed for a such element R, RAR =1 and since R and A are in G * , there exists some
Hence there is at least q − (2 l + 1) HMQV i-points forÂ toB.
As shown in Attack 2 given a HMQV i-point forÂ toB X ′ and its decomposition k, one can impersonateÂ toB with no more computations than needed by a HMQV execution. Notice that the important aspect is knowing the decomposition of an i-point.
Attack 2 HMQV impersonation ofÂ toB
Require: A HMQV i-point forÂ toB X ′ and its decomposition k.
(1) Send (Â,B, X ′ ) toB. A naive approach for decomposed i-point forÂ toB search consists in choosing u ∈ {0, 1} l and computing the 2 l points R ku = G k A −u , for k = 1, . . . , 2 l . If the hash functionH is supposed to be a random oracle, the probability thatH(R ku ,B) equals u is P r(H(R ku ,B) = u) = 1/2 l . The number of successes (R ku :H(R ku ,B) = u) in these computations is a binomial random variable with parameters (2 l , 1/2 l ); hence these computations lead to a decomposed i-point with probability P rs = 1 − (1 − 1/2 l ) 2 l ≈ 1 − e −1 ≈ 0.63 > 1/2 for l sufficiently large. Pollard's rho algorithm [24, 26, 25] can be modified to take into account decomposed i-points detection, the resulting algorithm produces either a decomposed i-point or a discrete logarithm; this approach is expected to duplicate the efficiency of the rho algorithm.
It is worthwhile to mention that the MQV variant wherein the shared secret between two partiesÂ andB is computed as σ = XAH (X) y+H(Y )b = Y BH (Y ) x+H(X)a (and the session as K = H(σ)) presents the following unfortunate aspect. If an attacker finds x 0 ∈ [1, q − 1] such that H(G x 0 ) = 0, then it can impersonate any entity to any other entity. Finding such an x 0 requires O(2 l ) operations. To impersonate a party, sayÂ, to a partyB the attacker sends (Â,B, X 0 ) toB, interceptsB's message toB, and computes σ = (Y BH (Y ) ) x 0 and K = H(σ); it then uses K to communicate withB on behalf ofÂ.
In the following proposition, we link partial ephemeral secret exponent leakage to impersonation attack. Proof. If an attacker learns s A , then it knows a HMQV i-point forÂ toB and its decomposition (XAH (X,B) = G s A i.e. X = G s A A −H(X,B) ); using Attack 2, it impersonatesÂ toB.
Remark 1.
(a) For the MQV(-C) protocol, if an attacker (partly) learns the ephemeral secret exponent in a session atÂ, it can not only impersonateÂ to its peer in the leaked session, but also to any other entity. A weaker form of this attack was proposed in [15] . (b) To meet the two-and-half exponentiations per party performance, which partly makes the attractiveness of the HMQV protocol, the ephemeral secret exponents have to be computed, and the exponentiation ((Y B e ) s A or (XA e ) s B ) performed. Ephemeral secret exponent leakage may happen (through side channel attacks for instance), independently of the ephemeral private keys. (c) Ephemeral secret exponent leakage does not imply neither static of ephemeral private key discloser. Indeed, one can show that from any algorithm A with complexity C A , which given s A , X, A andB, findsÂ's ephemeral private key x or the static one a, one can derive an algorithm which solves two instances of the DLP in G * , in C A + C DLP time complexity where C DLP is the complexity for solving one instance of the DLP in G. (d) The leakage of consecutive middle part bits on an ephemeral secret exponent is not discussed, but with tools from [7] , the analysis we propose applies in this case with minor modifications.
Ephemeral secret exponent leakage implies (but is not equivalent to) session key reveal, and does not imply neither static key reveal nor ephemeral key reveal; while it is not difficult to see that both ephemeral secret exponent and ephemeral key leakages on the same session imply the session owner's static key discloser.
Man in the Middle Attack using Session Secret Leakages
If in addition to s A , an attacker learns s B in a session atB, it can perform man in the middle attacks, betweenÂ andB, as in Algorithm 3. We denote by s B the ephemeral secret exponents the attacker learned atÂ andB respectively; X (l) and Y (l) areÂ andB's outgoing ephemeral keys in the sessions in which leakages happened. Notice that it is not required that the (s A and s B ) leakages happened in matching sessions.
Attack 3 Man in the middle
(g) Use K B to communicate withB on behalf ofÂ. (h) Use K A to communicate withÂ on behalf ofB. Algorithm 3 is merely a simultaneous impersonation ofÂ toB, andB toÂ. The session key thatÂ derives is
. This is the K A the attacker computes at step (e). Similarly, the session key thatB derives is
A ). Notice that the attack remains possible when communications are initiated byÂ (orB).
Security Model
We define a security model, inspired by the (extended) Canetti-Krawczyk model [5, 13] , for the (H)MQV type protocols. We aim to a better capture of session specific information leakages. While both ephemeral secret exponent and ephemeral key leakages on the same session imply the session owner's static private key disclosure, resistance to ephemeral secret exponent leakage is a desirable security attribute. We propose a security model which takes into account this security attribute.
Rationale of the model. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [13] , sessionspecific information leakages are captured through an ephemeral key reveal query. The ephemeral key of a session is required to contain all session specific information. When this requirement is fully satisfied, it becomes difficult to simulate consistently information leakages. In practice, ephemeral keys are not always defined to contain all session specific information; in the NAXOS [13] and CMQV [27] security arguments, ephemeral keys are not defined to contain the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) exponents.
In addition, session key derivation generally involves some intermediate results, on which leakages may happen; these intermediate results cannot always be computed, given only the session's ephemeral key. Hence leakages on these intermediate results are not necessarily captured in the eCK model. In the CMQV protocol (shown eCK secure) an ephemeral secret exponent leakage, allows an attacker to impersonate indefinitely the leaked session owner.
In the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model [5] , session secret leakages are captured through a session state reveal query. However, it is not always clear, which information in a session can be revealed, as this is left to be specified by each protocol. Moreover, the ephemeral information that can be available in a session depend on the reached step in the session's computations. Contrary to the ephemeral key reveal query, the session state reveal query cannot be issued on a test session, while it is desirable that an attacker which does not know both the static and ephemeral DH exponents of an entity implicated in a session should not be able to compute the session key. It is also difficult to figure out the practical meaning of the CK-security, as a protocol (HMQV for instance) may be both secure and insecure, depending on the session state's definition.
The ephemeral information that can be available in a session state depends on the reached step in the session's tree of computations. To capture precisely ephemeral information leakages, one has to consider sessions' tree of computations. In the model we propose, the eCK model is completed with reveal queries on sessions intermediate results. We define a reveal query on any intermediate value which computation requires a secret information. With these queries, we aim to an exhaustive capture of ephemeral information leakages. It is however difficult to simultaneously and consistently simulate leakages on both ephemeral keys and intermediate results. This is the reason why our model follows two stages. In the first, leakages on the intermediate results are considered; the second deals with ephemeral private keys leakages.
Session. We suppose n P(|q|) (for some polynomial P) partiesP i,i=1,...,n modeled as probabilistic polynomial time machines, and a certification authority (CA) trusted by all parties. All the static public keys are supposed to belong to G * , this corresponds to the fact that the CA is (only) required to verify that public keys are valid ones. Each party has a static public key together with a certificate binding his identity to his public key.
A session is an instance of a protocol run at a party. A session atÂ (with peerB) can be created with parameter (Â,B) or (B,Â, Y );Â is the initiator if the creation parameter is (Â,B), otherwise the responder. At session activation, a session state is created to contain the information specific to the session. Each session is identified with a quadruple (Â,B, X, ⋆), whereÂ is the session holder,B is the peer, X is the outgoing ephemeral key, and ⋆ is the incoming key Y if it exists, otherwise a special symbol meaning that an incoming ephemeral key is not received yet; in that case whenÂ receives the ephemeral public key Y, the session identifier is updated to (Â,B, X, Y ). Two sessions with identifiers (B,Â, Y, X) and (Â,B, X, Y ) are said to be matching. Notice that the session matching (B,Â, Y, X) can be any session (Â,B, X, ⋆); as X and Y are chosen uniformly at random in G * , a session cannot have (except with negligible probability) more than one matching session.
Adversary and Security. The adversary, denoted A, is a probabilistic polynomial time machine. It is a common assumption that an adversary is able to eavesdrop, modify, delete any message sent in a cryptographic protocol, or inject its own messages. This is captured through the assumption that outgoing messages are submitted to A for delivery (A decides about messages delivery); A is also supposed to control session activations at each partyP i via the Send(P i ,P j ) and Send(P j ,P i , Y ) queries, which makeP i initiate a session with peerP j or respond toP j . The adversary is also provided with the reveal queries from one of the following sets. At the beginning of its run, it adopts one of the following sets of queries; it can then perform queries from the selected set (and only those queries).
In Set 1, the following queries are allowed.
• StaticKeyReveal(party) to obtain the static private key of a party.
• SessionKeyReveal(session) to obtain the derived key in a session.
• SecretExponentReveal(session) to obtain the ephemeral secret exponent (s = x + da or y + eb) in a session.
• SecretGroupElementReveal(session) to obtain the session signature Z = W s A .
• EstablishParty(party) to register a static public key on behalf of a party; from there, the party is supposed totally controlled by A. A party against which this query is not issued is said to be honest. Notice that, we consider only the intermediate values which evaluation requires a secret information; as the attacker is supposed to control the communication links between parties, considering leakages on the other intermediate values is superfluous. We also implicitly assume that the considered protocol has a tree of computations "matching" that of the (H)MQV protocols; otherwise some queries (SecretExponentReveal for instance) may become meaningless. In Set 2, the allowed queries are the following; the definitions remain unchanged for the queries belonging also to Set 1.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(session) to obtain the ephemeral private key used by the session owner.
• StaticKeyReveal(party).
• SessionKeyReveal(session).
• EstablishParty(party).
Definition 4 (Session Freshness).
Let sid be the identifier of a completed session at an honest partyÂ, with some honest peerB, and sid * the matching session's identifier. The session sid is said to be ck-fresh, if none of the following conditions hold:
• A issues a SecretExponentReveal query on sid or sid * (if sid * exists);
• A issues a SecretGroupElementReveal query on sid or sid * ;
• A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on sid or sid * ;
• sid * does not exist and A makes a StaticKeyReveal query onB. And sid is said to be eck-fresh, if none of the following conditions hold:
• A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on sid or sid * (if sid * exists);
• A issues a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid;
• sid * exists and A makes a StaticKeyReveal query onB and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid * ; • sid * does not exist and A makes a StaticKeyReveal query onB.
Definition 5 (Protocol Security). Let Π be a protocol, such that if two honest parties complete matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key.
• The protocol Π is said to be ck-secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary (performing queries from Set 1) can distinguish a ck-fresh session key from a random value, chosen under the distribution of session keys, with probability (taken over the random coins of the adversary and the choices of static and ephemeral public keys in G) significantly greater than 1/2.
• Π is said to be eck-secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary (performing queries from Set 2) can distinguish an eck-fresh session key from a random value, chosen under the distribution of session keys, with probability significantly greater than 1/2.
• And Π is said to be secure, if it is both ck-secure and eck-secure.
A New Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol
In this section, we define the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXCR) and Full Dual exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) schemes, which confine to the minimum the consequences of ephemeral secret exponent leakages. Using these schemes, we define the Fully Hashed MQV (FHMQV) protocol, which preserves the performance of the (H)MQV protocol, in addition to provide resistance to the attacks we presented in section 2.
Full Exponential Challenge Response Signature Scheme
Definition 6 (FXCR signature scheme). LetB be an entity with public key B ∈ G * , andÂ a verifier.B's signature on a message m and challenge X provided byÂ ( The FXCR scheme delivers all the security attributes of the XCR scheme; in addition the "replay attack" we presented in section 2 does not hold anymore. Indeed, suppose an attacker which has learned s
When it is provided with a new challenge X (chosen at random) and the same message m, except with negligible probability X = X (l) (and X, m) ). Hence, to replay Y (l) on the message-challenge pair (m, X), the attacker has to find s B = y (l) +H(Y (l) , X, m)b; it is not difficult to see that if it can compute s B from s B (l) , then he can find b from s B , which is not feasible.
Definition 7 (FXCR Scheme Security). The FXCR scheme is said to be secure in G, if given a public key B, a challenge X 0 (B, X 0 ∈ R G * ), together with hashing and signing oracles, no adaptive probabilistic polynomial time attacker, can output with non negligible success probability a triple (m 0 , Y 0 , σ 0 ) such that:
is a valid signature with respect to the key B, and the message-challenge pair (m 0 , X 0 ); • (Y 0 , σ 0 ) was not obtained from the signing oracle with a query on (m 0 , X 0 ).
Using the "oracle replay" technique [22, 23] , we show that the FXCR scheme is secure in the sense of definition 7. Recall that a function F with parameter ζ is said to be negligible, if for every polynomial P, and every sufficiently large ζ, F(ζ) < (||P(ζ)||) −1 (|| · || denotes here the absolute value); otherwise F is said to be non-negligible. Proof. Suppose an attacker A, which given B, X 0 ∈ R G * succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging a FXCR signature, with respect to the public key B and the challenge X 0 . Using A we build a polynomial time CDH solver S which succeeds with non-negligible probability. The solver S provides A with random coins, and simulates the digest and signature queries. The interactions between S and A are described in Figure 4 . 
0 ) (if any) satisfies the following conditions. If not, S aborts.
• Under the RO model, the distribution of the simulated signatures is indistinguishable from the that of the real signatures generated byB, except the deviation that happens whenH(Y, X, m) was queried before. Let Q h and Q s be respectively the number of queries that A asks to the hashing and signing oracles. Since A is polynomial (in |q|) and Y is chosen uniformly at random in G, this deviation happens with probability less than (Q h + Q s )/q, which is negligible. Hence this simulation is perfect, except with negligible probability. Moreover the probability of producing a valid forgery without queryingH(Y 0 , X 0 , m 0 ) is 2 −l . Thus under this simulation, A outputs with non-negligible probability a valid forgery (m 0 , Y 0 , σ
0 . From the Forking lemma [23] , the repeat experiment produces with non-negligible probability a valid forgery (m 0 , Y 0 , σ (2) 0 ) with a digest e (2) 0 , which with probability 1 − 2 −l , is different from e (1) 0 . Then the computation
0 −e
gives CDH(B, X 0 ) with non-negligible success probability.
Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response Signature Scheme
Definition 8 (FDCR Signature Scheme). LetÂ andB be two entities with public keys A, B ∈ G * , and m 1 , m 2 two messages. The FDCR signature ofÂ andB on messages
, and e =H(Y, X, m 1 , m 2 ).
Notice that contrary to the DCR and XCR schemes, the FDCR signature ofÂ andB on messages m 1 , m 2 and challenges X, Y , is not a FXCR signature ofÂ on the message m 1 and challenge Y B e . 
Definition 9 (Security of the FDCR Scheme). Let
The simulated environment is perfect, except with negligible probability. The deviation happens when the same message-challenge pair (m 2 , Y ) is chosen twice in two signature queries on the same pair (m 1 , X). Let Q max is the maximum number of queries that A asks to the signing oracle. Since Y is chosen uniformly at random in G and A is polynomial, the deviation occurs with probability less than Q max /q, which is negligible (as A is polynomial in |q|.) Then, if A succeeds with non-negligible probability in FDCR forging attack, it succeeds also with nonnegligible probability under this simulation. And since S knows a, it outputs, from any valid
This is valid FXCR forgery on the message (m 1 0 , m 2 0 ) (the concatenation of m 1 0 and m 2 0 ) and challenge X 0 with respect to the public key B. And if A succeeds with non-negligible probability, so does S, contradicting Proposition 4.
The Fully Hashed MQV Protocol.
We can now derive the FHMQV protocol, which provides the efficiency and security attributes of the (H)MQV protocols, in addition to ephemeral secret exponent leakage resilience. The FHMQV protocol does not only provide a stronger security than the (C, H)MQV protocols; it seems more suited for implementations using computationally limited devices, to store (and protect) the private keys. Suppose an implementation of FHMQV or (H)MQV (using such devices) in which session keys are used by some application running in a untrusted host machine. Suppose that the ephemeral keys are computed in the device in idle-time. This idle-time pre-computation is common in practice. used in the host machine, and a leakage of only the ephemeral secret exponent, in a FHMQV session, does not compromise any other session.)
In FHMQV the computational effort of the device, in non idle-time can be safely reduced to few non-costly operations (two integer additions, one integer multiplication, and two digest computations), while for (H)MQV at least one exponentiation has to be performed in the device in non idle-time (in addition to few non-costly operations).
Security Analysis of the FHMQV Protocol
We suppose n P(|q|) (for some polynomial P) parties modeled as probabilistic polynomial time machines. In accord with our security model, the following queries are allowed.
• Send(Â,B) which makesÂ perform the step I of Protocol 5.
• Send(Â,B, X) which makesB perform the step II of Protocol 5.
• Send(Â,B, X, Y ) which makesÂ update the session identifier (Â,B, X, ⋆) (if any) to (Â,B, X, Y ), and perform the step III of Protocol 5; ifÂ does not hold a session with identifier (Â,B, X, ⋆), the call is ignored.
Ck-Security Arguments Proposition 6. Under the CDH assumption in G, and the RO model, the FHMQV protocol is ck-secure.
It is immediate from the FHMQV definition that, if two honest parties complete matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key. Suppose an adversary A which succeeds, with probability significantly greater than 1/2, in distinguishing a session key of a ck-fresh session (that we designate by (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 ) or test session) from random a value chosen under the distribution of session keys. A can only distinguish a ck-fresh session key from a random value in one of the following ways. Guessing attack: A guesses correctly the test session key. Key replication attack: A succeeds in making two non-matching sessions yield the same session key, it can then query a session key reveal on one of the two sessions and use the other as test session. Forging attack: A computes the test session signature and issues digest query to compute the session key.
Under the RO model, the probability of guessing correctly the output of the hash function is 2 −k ; and non-matching sessions cannot have (except with negligible probability) the same session key. It thus remains that if A succeeds with probability significantly greater than 1/2 in distinguishing a ck-fresh session key, from a random value chosen under the distribution of session keys, then it succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging attack. We thus suppose that A interacts in an n parties environment, and ends its run with non-negligible probability with an output (sid 0 , σ 0 ), where sid 0 is a ck-fresh session identifier, and σ 0 a guess of the sid 0 session signature.
Let E denote the event "A succeeds in forging the session signature of some ck-fresh session." The event E divides in: (a) E.1: "A succeeds in forging the session signature of some ck-fresh session, which matching session exits", and (b) E.2: "A succeeds in forging the session signature of some ck-fresh session without matching session." Since a session is required to be ck-fresh, in E.1 the StaticKeyReveal query is allowed on bothÂ andB. In E.2 the StaticKeyReveal query is allowed onÂ (but not onB). Now since A succeeds with non-negligible probability, either E.1 or E.2 occurs with non-negligible probability; it then suffices to show that neither E.1 nor E.2 can happen with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E.1
Suppose that E.1 occurs with non-negligible probability. Using A, we build a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with non-negligible probability. The solver S takes as input X 0 , Y 0 ∈ R G * and interacts with A as described below.
(1) S simulates A's environment, with n partiesP 1 , . . . ,P n ; recall that A is supposed to be polynomial, we thus suppose that each party is activated at most m times, m P(|q|) for some polynomial P. 
. , m} (with the choice of (i, j, t), S is guessing the test session).
We refer toP i asÂ andP j asB. S assigns to eachP k a random static key pair (p k , P k = G p k ), and answers to A queries as follows;H queries are simulated in the usual way (see the proof of Proposition 5). (3) At A's Send(P l ,P m ) query, S chooses x ∈ R [1, q − 1], computes X = G x , creates a session state with identifier (P l ,P m , X, ⋆), and provides A with the message (P l ,P m , X). (Notice that S can compute the session FDCR signature of any session different from the t-th session atÂ -and its matching session.) (6) When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer isB, S provides A with the message (Â,B, X 0 ); otherwise, S aborts. (7) When A activates the session matching t-th session atÂ, S provides A with (B,Â, Y 0 ). (8) At A's digest query on (σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ), S responds as follows:
• If there exists a completed session with identifier sid = (P l ,P m , X, Y ) or sid = (P m ,P l , Y, X) and with initiatorP l , and if σ is the sid session's FDCR signature, S returns the sid session key.
• Else, if the same query was made previously, S returns the previously returned value.
• Else S responds with π ∈ R {0, 1} λ , and sets H(σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ) = π. • A halts with a test session different from the t-th session atÂ.
• A issues a SecretExponentReveal, a SecretGroupElementReveal, or a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session.
• A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. (11) IfÂ provides a guess σ 0 of the signature of the t-th session atÂ, S outputs (σ 0 )(
as a guess for CDH(X 0 , Y 0 ). Otherwise S aborts.
Fact. If A succeeds with non-negligible probability in E.1, S outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(X
Proof. The simulation of A's environment is perfect except with negligible probability; when A activates the t-th session atÂ, the X 0 provided to A is chosen uniformly at random in G * , its distribution is the same as that of the real X. The same argument holds for Y 0 . The probability of guessing correctly the test session is (n 2 m) −1 ; and if E.1 occurs and S guesses correctly the test session, S does not abort. Thus S succeeds with probability (n 2 m) −1 Pr(E.1) where negligible terms are ignored. In addition, when A outputs a correct guess for the test session signature, S outputs
Moreover if A is polynomial, S is also polynomial. This shows that E.1 cannot happen with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E.2
If E.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, using A, we build a polynomial time FDCR forger, with non-negligible success probability. For this purpose, we modify the simulation in the analysis of E.1 as follows.
• S takes as input a ∈ R [1, q − 1], and X 0 , B ∈ R G * .
•Â's key pair is set to (a, G a ), andB's public key to B (B's private key is unknown to S).
• At A's Send(P l ,B, X) query, S answers as follows: • When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; else, S provides A with (Â,B, X 0 ). • S aborts in any of the following situations.
-A activates atB a session matching the t-th session atÂ.
-A halts with a test session different from the t-th session atÂ.
-A issues a StaticKeyReveal query onB, or an EstablishParty query onÂ orB.
-A issues a SecretExponentReveal, SessionSignatureReveal, or a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ. The simulation of A's environment is perfect, except with negligible probability. The deviation happens when the same Y is chosen twice as ephemeral key in two sessions atB with the same peerP l ; this happens with probability less than m/q, which is negligible. Hence, under this simulation, A succeeds with non-negligible probability in E.2. And when A outputs a correct forgery, and S guesses correctly the test session, S outputs a valid FDCR forgery on messagesÂ, B, and challenges X 0 , Y 0 , with respect to the public keys A and B; contradicting Proposition 5.
Neither E.1 nor E.2, can happen with non-negligible probability; the FHMQV protocol is ck-secure.
Resistance to Reflection Attacks
We show here that the FHMQV protocol provides resistance to reflection attacks (for ck-fresh sessions). A session with identifier sid = (Â,Â, X, Y ) is said to be ck-fresh if none of these conditions hold:
• A issues a SecretExponentReveal, a SecretGroupElementReveal, or a SessionKeyReveal query on sid or sid * (if sid * exists); • sid * does not exist and A makes a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ. Recall that under the RO model, guessing and key replication attacks cannot succeed, except with negligible probability. It suffices to show that no polynomially bounded adversary can compute, with non-negligible success probability, the session signature of a ck-fresh session
Let Analysis of F.1. If F.1 happens with non-negligible probability, using A, we build a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with non-negligible probability. To do this, we reuse the simulation in the analysis of E.1, except the following differences.
• S takes as input a,
•B's key pair and identity are set to that ofÂ. A's simulated environment remains perfect except with negligible probability; and if A succeeds with non-negligible probability, in event F.1, then under this simulation it outputs with nonnegligible probability a valid signature forgery σ 0 . And then S outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(X 0 , Y 0 ) from σ 0 , a, d, and e. This shows that under the CDH assumption and RO model, F.1 cannot happen, except with negligible probability.
Analysis of F.2.
If F.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, using A, we build a polynomial time machine, which given A = G a outputs with non-negligible probability G (a 2 ) . Such a "squaring" CDH solver can in turn be used as a general CHD solver, which succeeds with non-negligible probability [16] . We simulate A's environment as in the analysis of E.1, with the following modifications.
• S takes as input A ∈ R G * (Â =B).
•Â's public key is set to A; its roles are simulated in the same way as that ofB in the analysis E.2.
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, S chooses x 0 ∈ R [1, q − 1], and provides A with the message (Â,Â, X 0 = G x 0 ); and if A activates atB a session matching t-th session at A, S aborts.
• If A issues a static key reveal onÂ, S aborts.
The simulated environment remains perfect, except with negligible probability; and if A succeeds with non-negligible probability in F.2, then under this simulation, it outputs with nonnegligible probability a valid forgery σ 0 of the test session's signature. And then since S knows x 0 it outputs with non-negligible probability
Hence, given a public key A, S outputs with non-negligible probability a valid and fresh FXCR signature, on message (Â,B) (concatenation ofÂ andB), and challenge A (the challenge equals the public key) with respect to the public key A. Using the "oracle replay" technique (as in the proof of Proposition 4), S yields a polynomial machine, which given A = G a , outputs with non-negligible probability A a = G (a 2 ) ; contradicting the CDH assumption.
Ephemeral Private Keys Leakage Resilience (eck-security)
The arguments for this security attribute do not derive from the analysis in section 4. The reason is that we cannot simultaneously and consistently simulate both SecretExponentReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal.
Hashed Full Dual Challenge Response Scheme
Definition 10 (Hashed FDCR (HFDCR) signature scheme). LetÂ,B be two entities with public keys A, B ∈ R G * . The HFDCR signature ofÂ andB on messages m 1 , m 2 is
where σ is the FDCR signature ofÂ andB on messages m 1 , m 2 , and challenges X, Y . 
. For the HFDRC security arguments, we need the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption.
Definition 12 ([21]
). Let G = G be a cyclic group. An algorithm is said to be a Decisional Diffie-Hellman Oracle (DDHO) for G, if on input G, X = G x , Y = G y , Z ∈ G, it outputs 1 if and only if Z = G xy . The Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption is said to hold in G, if given a DDHO for G, no polynomially bounded algorithm can solve the CDH problem in G, with non-negligible success probability.
We now prove the security of the HFDCR scheme, under the GDH assumption and the RO model.
Proposition 7. Under the GDH assumption in G, and the RO model, the HFDCR scheme is secure in the sense of definition 11.
Proof. Suppose a polynomially bounded attacker A, which given a DDHO, A, B ∈ R G * , and x 0 , y 0 ∈ R [1, q−1], outputs with non-negligible success probability a valid and fresh HFDCR A,B signature on some messages m 1 0 , m 2 0 with respect to challenges
Non-matching HFDCR signature queries cannot have the same signature value, except with negligible probability. And guessing the output of the hash function cannot be performed with non-negligible success probability. We can thus suppose that A succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging attack. Using A and a DDHO, we build a polynomial time CDH solver S which succeeds with non-negligible probability. The solver S provides A with random coins and simulates the signature queries; it takes as input A, B ∈ R G * , x 0 , y 0 ∈ R [1, q − 1], and outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(A, B).
(1) At A'sH digest query on (X, Y, m 1 , m 2 ), S does the following:
• If a value is already assigned toH(X, Y, m 1 , m 2 ), S provides A with the value of Under the RO model, A's simulated environment is perfect except with negligible probability; hence if A succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging a HFDRC signature, it succeeds under this simulation with the same probability, except a negligible difference. Since S knows x 0 , y 0 , and A succeeds with non-negligible probability, S outputs with non-negligible probability
contradicting the GDH assumption.
Application to FHMQV
Using the HFDCR security, we now show that the FHMQV protocol meets the eck-security definition.
Proposition 8. Under the GDH assumption in G, and the RO model, the FHMQV protocol is eck-secure.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since guessing and key replication attacks cannot succeed with nonnegligible probability, suppose A succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging attack. Let E' be the event "A succeeds in forging an eck-fresh session signature." E' divides in E'.1: "A succeeds in forging the session signature of some eck-fresh session, which matching session exists", and E'.2: "A succeeds in forging the session signature of some eck-fresh session, without matching session." It suffices to show that neither E'.1 nor E'.2 can happen with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E'.1. Since the test session sid is required to be eck-fresh and sid * exists, the strongest queries that A can perform are:(i) StaticKeyReveal queries on bothÂ andB; (ii) EphemeralKeyReveal queries on both sid and sid * ; (iii) a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid * ; (iv) an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid and a StaticKeyReveal query onB. As from any polynomial time machine which succeeds in E'.1, and performs weaker queries than those above, one can build a polynomial time machine, which succeeds with same probability and performs one of the strongest queries, it suffices to show that none of the events E'.1.1: "E'.1 ∧ A performs StaticKeyReveal queries on bothÂ andB", E'.1.2: "E'.1 ∧ A performs EphemeralKeyReveal queries on both sid and sid * ", E'. 1.3 : "E'.1 ∧ A performs a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid * ", E'. 1.4 : "E'.1 ∧ A performs an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid and a StaticKeyReveal query onB", can occur with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E'.1.1. Suppose that E'.1.1 occurs with non-negligible probability; using A, we build a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with non-negligible probability. For this purpose, we use the same simulation as in the analysis of E.1 with the following modifications (recall that the allowed queries are that from Set 2):
• If A issues a SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal, or an StaticKeyReveal query, S answers faithfully.
• In any of the following situations, S aborts.
-A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session.
-A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session. -A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. The simulated environment remains perfect, except with negligible probability. The probability of guessing correctly the test session is (n 2 m) −1 . If A succeeds with non-negligible probability in E'.1.1, under this simulation A outputs a valid forgery of the t-th session atÂ with non-negligible probability. Hence S outputs CDH(X 0 , Y 0 ) (from A's forgery and a, b, d, e) with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E'.1.2. We reuse the simulation of the analysis of E.1, with the following modifications:
• S takes as input x 0 , y 0 ∈ R [1, q − 1], and A, B ∈ R G * .
•Â andB's public keys are set to A and B (the private keys are unknown).
• At A's Send(P m ,P l , Y ) query, withP l =Â orB, S responds as follows.
creates a session state with identifier (P l ,P m , X, Y ), provides A with the outgoing message (P l ,P m , X).
• At Send(P l ,P m , X, Y ) query, withP l =Â orB, S answers as follows:
-S updates the session identifier (P l ,P m , X, ⋆) (if any) to (P l ,P m , X, Y ).
-If a no value is assigned to HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ), S chooses π ∈ R {0, 1} λ and sets HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ) = π; if no value is assigned toH(X, Y,
• At A's digest query on (σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ), withP l =Â orB, orP m =Â orB, S does the following: -If a value is already assigned to HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ), and if
is already defined, the values of d and e are already assigned), S returns the value of HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ).
-Else, S chooses π ∈ R {0, 1} λ , sets H(σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ) = π, and provides A with π.
(this is verified using the DDHO), S sets HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ) = π.
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; otherwise S provides A with the outgoing message (Â,B, X 0 = G x 0 ). • When A activates the session matching t-th session atÂ, S provides A with (B,Â, Y 0 = G y 0 ).
• If A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session, S answers faithfully. • In the following situations S aborts.
-A issues a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ orB.
-A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. The simulated environment remains perfect, except with negligible probability, and the probability of guessing correctly the test session is (n 2 m) −1 . If A succeeds with a FDCR signature σ 0 , and S guesses correctly the test session, S outputs a valid HFDCR forgery
Analysis of E'.1.3 and E'.1.4. SinceÂ andB roles are symmetrical in E'.1.3 and E'.1. 4 , it suffices to show that E'.1.3 cannot occur with non-negligible probability. We modify, the simulation used in the analysis of E.1 as follows:
• S takes as input X 0 , B ∈ R G * .
•B's public key is set to B (the private key is unknown to S), andÂ's key pair is (a =
• At A's Send(P m ,B, X) query, S responds as follows: • At A's digest query on (σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ), withP l =B, orP m =B, S responds as follows:
-If a value is assigned to HF DCR P l ,Pm (X, Y,P l ,P m ), and if
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; otherwise, S provides A with the outgoing message (Â,B, X 0 ).
• When A activates the session matching t-th session atÂ, S chooses y 0 ∈ R [1, q − 1], and provides A with (B,Â, Y 0 = G y 0 ).
• If A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the session matching the t-th session atÂ, S answers faithfully.
• In any of the following situations S aborts.
-A issues a StaticKeyReveal query onB.
-A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ.
-A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. The simulation remains perfect, except with negligible probability; if A succeeds with nonnegligible probability in event E'.1.3, S outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(X 0 , B), from A's forgery (and a, y 0 , d, and e); contradicting the GDH assumption.
Under the GDH assumption and the RO model, none of the events E'. To show that E'.2.1 cannot happen with non-negligible probability, the simulation used in the analysis of E'.1.3 can be modified such that if A activates a session matching the t-th session atÂ, S aborts. Since A succeeds with non-negligible probability, using A, S outputs with nonnegligible probability (Y 0 B e ) x 0 from A forgery and a. Hence, from the forking lemma, using S, one can build a polynomial machine S ′ which given X 0 , B, outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(X 0 , B). One can then show that under the RO model and the GDH assumption, E'.2.1 cannot occur, except with negligible probability.
For the analysis of E'.2.2, the simulation the analysis of E'.1.2 can be modified to take as input x 0 , A, B, and aborts when A activates a session matching the t-th session atÂ. If A succeeds in E'.2.2 (and then under this simulation), using A's forgery, S outputs (Y 0 B e ) a ; and using the "oracle replay" technique, S can be transformed into a machine which given A, B outputs with non-negligible probability CDH (A, B) , contradicting the GDH assumption.
Reflection Attacks Resilience (sketch).
With arguments similar to that of subsection 5.1.3, one can show that reflection attacks cannot hold against eck-fresh sessions. Indeed, ifÂ =B, and if the session matching the test session exists, A is not allowed to perform both a StaticKeyReveal query onÂ, and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session or its matching session. And if the test session's matching session does not exist, a StaticKeyReveal query on A is not allowed.
The analysis of E'.1.1 remains valid ifÂ =B. And in E'.1.2, whenÂ =B a polynomial time successful attacker, yields a polynomial machine which given A = G a outputs G (a 2 ) . Under these restrictions on the allowed queries ifÂ =B, and with minor modifications in the analysis of E'.1.1 and E'.1.2, one can show that under the RO model and the GDH assumption, the FHMQV protocol provides resistance to reflection attacks for eck-fresh sessions.
Main Differences between FHMQV and HMQV Security Arguments
We summarize the most important differences between the HMQV and FHMQV security arguments. Building blocks and adversary model. The design of FHMQV relies on the FXCR and FDCR signature schemes. While in the XCR scheme as in the FXCR scheme, both s A and x leakages in the same session implyÂ's private key discloser. In the FXCR scheme, an adversary which learns s A is unable to forge A's signature. The FHMQV adversary model allows ephemeral secret exponent leakage. The impersonation and man in the middle attacks we presented in section 2 do not hold against FHMQV. Key replication attacks resilience. At session key derivation in FHMQV, ephemeral keys and peers identities are hashed with the session's FDCR signature (K = H(σ,Â,B, X, Y )).
Since non matching sessions cannot have (except with negligible probability) the same ephemeral keys, and non matching digest queries cannot have (except with negligible probability) the same digest value, the analysis of key replication attacks is immediate for the FHMQV protocol. Ephemeral private keys leakage resilience. To show this security attribute for FHMQV, we define the Hashed FDCR signature scheme. For the HMQV protocol, it is used a hashed variant of the XCR, namely the HCR signature scheme [11] . While both HFDCR and HCR security arguments rely on the GDH assumption, for the HFDCR scheme the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA1) [4] is not needed, whereas it is required for the HCR scheme.
The FHMQV-C Protocol
As shown in [11] , no two message key agreement protocol can meet the perfect forward secrecy security attribute; key confirmation security attribute (for both peers) cannot be achieved also. Nevertheless these security attributes may be desirable; the FHMQV protocol can be added with a third message, yielding the FHMQV-C protocol, we describe in Protocol 6; KDF 1 and KDF 2 are key derivation functions, and MAC a message authentication code. If any verification fails, the execution aborts.
Concluding Remarks
We proposed a complementary analysis of the Exponential Challenge Response and Dual Exponential Challenge Response signature schemes, which are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol. On the basis of this analysis, we showed how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be performed against the HMQV protocol, when some session specific information leakages happen. We proposed the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXCR) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes, with security arguments. Using these schemes, we defined the Fully Hashed MQV (FHMQV) protocol, which preserves the efficiency and security attributes of the (H)MQV protocols, and resists to ephemeral secret exponent leakage.
We defined a Canetti-Krawczyk type security model, based on session's tree of computations, which provides stronger reveal queries to the adversary, and showed that the FHMQV meets this security definition. The FHMQV protocol can be added with a third message, yielding the FHMQV-C protocol, which provides all the security attributes of the FHMQV protocol, added with key confirmation and perfect forward secrecy.
In a forthcoming stage, we will be interested in the analysis of relations between the security model we propose and the Canetti-Krawczyk and extended Canetti-Krawczyk security models.
